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" All life therefore comes back to the question of our speech, the medium
through which we communicate with each other. . . . The more it suggests
and expresses the more we live by it—the more it promotes and enhances life.
Its quality, its authenticity, its security, are hence supremely important for
the general multifold opportunity, for the dignity and integrity, of our exist-
ence."—Henry James.
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MY MANY KIND SYMPATHISERS AND FRIENDS
AND TO
ALL THE YOUNG WORLD

PREFACE
SiGNiFics may be briefly and provisionally defined
as the study of the nature of Significance in all
its forms and relations, and thus of its working
in every possible sphere of human interest and
purpose. But the fact that this study is com-
pletely neglected even in education renders a
fully satisfactory definition difficult at present to
formulate. The interpretative function is, in
truth, the only one in any direct sense ignored
or at least casually treated. And yet it is that
w^hich naturally precedes and is the very condi-
tion of human intercourse, as of man's mastery
of his world.
In reading the following pages two things
must throughout be borne in mind.
First, that the plea for Signifies can only as
yet be written in that very medium—conven-
tional language— which so sorely needs to be
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lifted out of its present morass of shifting con-
fusion and disentangled from a rank growth of
falsifying survival ; and second, that the present
w^riter has no claim to make that plea as it
should be made by those who, even as things
are, could do it far better justice.
Readers must also be warned that the book
is not a continuous Essay, still less a systematic
Treatise. It consists of a selection made from
a great number of short papers, written over a
course of years, and always without any view of
publication. Some of these papers were intended
to explain to correspondents and friends the
writer's position with reference to language ;
and others, again, were the form in which the
writer recorded for personal use some new aspect
or way of putting the matter, as it suggested
itself. It has been thought that a selection of
such Papers, of which these are but a few
examples arranged and modified as seemed ad-
visable, would serve to indicate some directions
in which the theme of earlier writings could be
developed.
In the Appendix will be found a small sup-
plementary selection of a different kind ; that
is, representative expressions of the needlessly
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narrow limitations and positive obstructions of
language which are now beginning to be widely-
felt.
It must finally be borne in mind that the
suggestions here offered constitute little more
than an elementary sketch of a vast subject.
Even as contributed by the writer, there is
abundant material for succeeding volumes, show-
ing the practical bearing of Signifies, not only on
language but on every possible form of human
expression in action, invention, and creation.
I now have to acknowledge my debt of grati-
tude to those who have helped me to make
possible this suggestion of a central need and its
true fulfilment.
In a previous stage of the work—that repre-
sented by What is Meaning ?—I had to return
thanks for the ungrudging help of a long list
of distinguished advisers, who were also friendly
critics. But of course I had no excuse for again
troubling those who had so generously responded
to my first appeal.
In this case I have to repeat my gratitude
to Professor Stout, to whom I owe more than
I can express. I must also warmly thank
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Dr. Slaughter and Mr. Greenstreet, and a few
others who have indirectly helped on the work
or encouraged the worker.
My main thanks, however, in the present
undertaking are due to Mr. William Macdonald,
without whose expert aid I could not, from
somewhat failing strength, have faced so for-
midable a task.
V. W.
The fuueral of Mr. William Macdonald, man
of letters and reviewer, took place at Harrow on
Saturday. He was born a cripple, but triumphed
over physical weakness. As a child he is said to have
read Homer with ease. He was with Henley on the
National Observer, edited Lamb's works, and wrote
various biographies, including those of Bailee aisd
Benjamin Frankliu.
/Ur-^^-pT^: /r-'*^ 27.///-^
IThere are probably many who dimly realise,
and would provisionally admit, that our present
enormous and ever-growing developments of
mechanical power and command are there to be
interpreted in terms of psychology. This must
presumably affect not only the very minds which
are conceiving and applying them to such
tremendous and apparently illimitable purpose,
but also the thinkers concerned with the mental
sphere itself, its content, and its range.
We may thus suspect, if not actually infer,
that human thought also is on the threshold of
corresponding developments of power,—develop-
ments to which the " new birth " of scientific
rnethod in the nineteenth century was but the
prelude and preparation. If, indeed, we deny
this conclusion, or dispute this assumption, we
may effectually hold such a development in arrest
—or risk forcing it out in unhealthy forms—
just as, three hundred years ago, the spirit of
I B
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scientific discovery was fettered and retarded on
the verge of its great career of achievement.
The explanation is in part, if only in part, the
same now as it was then. For in the pre-
Baconian age the study of phenomena, the
inquiry into
" the causes of things," was not
more inhibited by theological prepossessions and
denunciations than by the dominance of an
intellectual nomenclature which ruled reality out
of the universe and confidently took its place
in all disquisition or discussion upon Man and
Nature. The forward step taken was largely
the result of a breaking of the barriers created
by traditional terminology, a pushing aside of
fictitious formulas, and a coming directly into
the presence of things in order to learn whatever




Whole. All the conditions — especially the
supreme condition, an urgent need
—are now
existent for a second and similar forward step,
but upon another plane and to higher purposes.
For the fresh advance which now seems im-
minent, as it is sorely needed, should be no mere
continuation of the Baconian search, the accumu-
lation of data for a series of inferences regarding
the properties of the material system as usually
understood, but rather the interpretation, the
translation at last into valid terms of life and
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thought, of the knowledge already so abundantly
gained. While man fails to make this transla-
tion—to moralise and humanise his knowledge
of the cosmos, and so to unify and relate it to
himself—his thinking is in arrears, and mentally
he lags behind his enacted experience. That we
in this age do lag behind, and that we have thus
far failed to achieve a great and general act of
translation, is a loss chiefly due to our unanimous
neglect to understand Expression, its nature,
conditions, range of form and function, unrealised
potencies and full value or worth. And there-
fore the first message of what is now to be
named Signifies ^ is that we must amend this
really inhuman fault ; that we must now study
Expression precisely as we have long been study-
ing
" Nature " and " Mind " in the varying
ranges of both these terms.
We must do this
;
for until we do it, not
merely metaphysical theory but natural fact, as
well as moral and social valuations and aims,
must continue to be perpetually misinterpreted
because mis-stated. Great tracts of experience,
direct and indirect, remain without an ordered
vocabulary or notation—and better none than
those which many others have—exactly as great
^ For a definition of this term see the Oxford Dictionary, the
American Dictionary of Philosophy, and the Encyclopadia Britannica,
nth edit.
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regions of natural fact remained without recog-
nition and without name until man almost
suddenly discovered that he had been looking
for the whats and hows and whys of the world
he lived in in the wrong direction and by the
wrong method. At last he saw his true way—
that of faithfully interrogating Nature, and
rigorously testing his reading ot her answer
—and rich has been the reward of following it
loyally. But the proper complement of this
wonderful step forward, its very issue, must be
the opening up of another true way hitherto
untrodden. It must be the recognition and use
of a method, a mental procedure and habit,
enabling us to perceive the treasures of truth,
the implications of reality, that even now are
only hidden from us by our contented subjection
to the tyranny of misfitting Expression,
—
Expres-
sion, of course, of all kinds, but mainly expression
in language, taken in its ordinary sense.
Our punishment here is that some of the
most intimate and homely as well as important
and significant forms of experience, some of
the plainest facts and most real existences in the
world, remain ' unknowable
'





and therefore ' unthink-
able
'
in any now fitting sense. As a fact,
however, as we are constantly, though un-
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consciously witnessing, we can think in an
embarrassed and hindered way much more than
language, in the forms which social and other
conventions have imposed upon it, allows us
satisfactorily to express. In all thoughtful and
able writing we continually meet with signs of
a sense of shortcoming in expressing given
conceptions : but whatever the failure, the
conceptions are there.
In these cases we do note the inadequacy of
language to serve. In others, and more fre-
quently, we note the fear of its great fund of
fallacies. We constantly find scattered through-
out the text of every thoughtful treatise what
are
essentially footnotes of protest or warning,
made needful only by the universal attitude of a
reader who has never been trained to demand
new and fruitful ideas, and to be ready to
welcome new and suggestive modes of setting
these forth. For lack of such training, the
reader persistently reads the old prepossessions
into the new statement of truth, and so merely
works over, ad nauseam^ the bare and dead tissues
of used-up thought, once living and active, now
mummied.
Our language has been full of life, since all
its similes, all its associations, like all its as-
sumptions, were once in perfect accord with
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the current conceptions of
'
nature,'—our own
nature included,— and with our ideas of
'motion, matter, and mind.' But now, just as
the forms of expression called social convention
and common law no longer fit our knowledge
of the biological and psychological facts of life,
are confining us to stunted and mean conceptions
of morality, and are causing cruel travesties of
justice whether social or legal ; just as the form
of expression called music puzzles and baffles,
while it fascinates us and leads to barren con-
troversy ;
^
just, indeed, as all current forms of
expression, except, perhaps, the fast growing
modes of mathematical symbolism tend to do
this—so the form of expression called linguistic,
our phrase and our word spoken or written,
betrays us daily more disastrously, and atrophies
alike action and thought.
^ See Edmund Gurney's "Power of Sound" and Gehring's
"Expression in Music," Phil. Rev., July 1903, and many other
recent Essays on Music.
II









of a nose, entirely
(as to its position and office) outside the scope of
our modifying control. And it is true that we
cannot invert our nose, or give it four nostrils, or
present it with the power of hearing or sight.
Neither, indeed, can we develop it into an organ
of (at present) transcendent smell, no, nor even
restore to it its pristine and sub-human privileges.





when speaking of language.
Rather, we have painfully earned the possession
of speech by learning to control and order
the sounds producible by our evolving larynx,
and by continuously, consistently, arduously,
purposively developing the complexities of the
resulting system of vocal signs. In doing this
we have evolved and developed syntax and
prosody and much else that the philologist,
orator, or poet can expound to us, or use to
influence our feeling and action. The point is,
7
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that just when the need of adding consensus to
a so far accomplished control was most urgent,
and its neglect most certain to be disastrous to
our intellectual fortunes ; just when a high
civilisation and what we call the modern era of
discovery and its reaction on philosophical
thought and practical life set in, we began to
lose more and more the very idea of a social
control, and of power to direct the development,
of the most precious of all our acquirements,
that of articulate speech.
I can never forget the amazement I felt
when I first began my study of philology and
linguistics and the origins of language, and
realised this fact and its full significance. The
writers one and all treated language, not as you
would treat muscle, as a means of work to be
brought under the most minute, elaborate and
unfailing functional control, but as you might
treat some distant constellation in space and
its, to us, mysterious movements. We might
describe such a heavenly object and then lay
down what seemed to be the conditions of its
existence and activities. We might point out
precedents ; possible origins ; possible destinies ;
possible effects on other systems, including our
own. But we should remain consciously and
profoundly helpless to modify in the most
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triflings degree, or in any sense, its career and its
perturbing or contributory powers.
It does not seem to have dawned upon any
one, either specialist or
'
lay,' what a tremendous
absurdity all this way of regarding language
involves. No wonder, however, when so far
no writer on the subject of language has ever
reminded us with any emphasis, still less with
the needed impressiveness, that the one crucial
question in all Expression, whether by action
or sound, symbol or picture, is its special pro-
perty, first of Sense, that in which it is used,
then of Meaning as the intention of the user,
and, most far-reaching and momentous of all, of
implication, of ultimate Significance.
When the cardinal importance of all forms
of Expression, but pre-eminently of language,
has been impressed on a coming generation
from its very infancy, that generation will rise
and resume an efficient direction of its own
greatest acquisition. We have done, we are
doing this with extensions of muscle and
sensation
;
with Machine, Instrument, and
Apparatus. We must do it with a greater than
these in any ordinary sense of the words. We
must do it with the greatest of extensions, that
of natural cry into articulate and reasoned
speech. And this, not merely as a question of
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redressing and giving better finish to a frame-
work, or of improving on conventional grammar,
prosody, and so forth, but as the development of
an expansive and, so to say, organic power as yet
only in embryo. And surely it is evident that
no rhetoric and but little imagination are needed
to convey an idea of what may be hoped for
when this result has been at last, through a
significally sane education, brought about. It
is indeed the plainest of common-sense that
concentration upon the value of all Sign, and
the effective co-ordination of all our means of
enhancing and realising this to the very utmost,
must bring about a forward step, one of the
greatest Man has ever made and the world has
ever seen.
Ill
It is true that we sometimes seem to lay claim
to such control, as when we praise an orator or
writer for his " command of language." But
there is, in fact, no such command. There is an
amazing and an even contented subserviency and
helplessness, leading too often to inexcusable
defect or deviation of sense.
We conceive that the nearest approach to
the mastery which is our true birthright was
achieved in what we call the classical era. And
we are still living in an almost literal sense on
its legacy. But the spirit of its conquests and
domination is lost, and with that the lesson of its
effective greatness. To a large extent, though
in varying degrees in different races, we avail
ourselves of attitude, gesture, and tone by these
primitive means, shared in varying (and often to
us imperceptible) modes and degrees by the
whole organic world. But our speech constantly
mocks us and our interest. This is not the fault
of Expression itself in any form, least of all of
articulate expression, that loyal creation and
II
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unfailing servant of Man, ready and untiring as
inexhaustible, waiting only for our recognition,
and for that commanding guidance which only
in the most important case of all we have failed
to apply. No : it is our own fault.
The idea that such neglect and helplessness
are inherent in the case is peculiarly inept.
Articulate expression is the elaborated and trans-
figured form of attitude, gesture, and tone ; and
more yet, of the marvellous skill of hand directed
by creative brain, of the inventor and worker,
the representative of imagination and reason.
Why do we only ' invent
'
mechanical instru-
ments, when the greatest instrument of all lies
in comparative neglect, as a thing with which
we have nothing to do beyond doing what we
can with it as it is ? Speech gives our
'
mind,'
our thought, our conception ; it conveys our
knowledge, describes our difficulties, records our
endeavours and our successes or defeats, warns
or encourages, notifies objection, refutes error,
exposes blunder or inaccuracy ; and finally
explains and enables us to apply the principles of
achievement of any kind. Having the offered
service of such a power as this, why should we
slight or disregard its promise, or be content
with anything less than its highest efficiency,
which will also be ours ?
IV
The most important elements of experience are
distinction and unification, comparison and com-
bination — analysis and synthesis. We first
analyse what is called a confused manifold,





we synthetise what we have distinguished to
the uttermost. If the result were an actual
complex, say a system of motions, particles, or
masses, we should take care not to muddle up
the constituents. We might pay too obviously
dear for that ! But in language this elementary
rule of practical or even rational procedure is
violated by our pernicious misuse and perversion
of one of the most splendid of all our intellectual
instruments, namely, the image or the figure ;
the image which is not merely the analogue, but
in a broad and true sense the linear descendant






Now we do know the danger of actual
13
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optical illusion and of delusion arising from
disease of mind or body. We do understand
that if we supposed we saw solid earth beyond
a cliif-edge, and walked over it, we should be
killed
;
and we infer this, although wc had not
deliberately realised or examined it. But we do
not see that we are killing or injuring ourselves
mentally by tumbling down logical precipices or
into metaphorical pits and so on, because of the
traps set by false mental images in language.
Upon the presumptions suggested by these dis-
tortions of image we too often act, and in our
thinking are continually influenced by them.
Therefore it is hardly an exaggeration to say
that within the realm of speech our procedure
is that of the insane.
Hence the divisions, the antagonisms between
men of goodwill. Hence the unsound pessimism
and the equally or more unsound optimism which
distort our interpretation of the world.
Hence, indeed, the
' insoluble problem,' even
that of ' Life ' itself, though if really a problem
it must of course be soluble. If we could but
see this
;
if our insanity of mental image could
be cured or, rather, averted in childhood ; if
our imagery were rectified ; then ideas would
emerge which now are killed in the germ.
Then conceptions would be formed which now
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never come to the birth. Then mental organ-
isms would come to perfect maturity, which
now are stunted and deformed. Then beauty,
dignity, grace of which as yet we have less than
a possible measure, might be hoped for.
Through the prevalence of misfitting imagery,
which continually misrepresents the real aspects
and relations of things, and warps our reasoning
as well as our vision of the world, we are really
living in what is (comparatively speaking) a kind




' here and there into definite delusions
about which we are controversial and emphatic.
We need a linguistic oculist to restore lost
focussing power, to bring our images back to
reality by some normalising kind of lens. Mean-
while the dementia of our metaphysics, popular





are internal—inside some non-
entity not specified. Matter is all outside this
nonentity.^ Distinction is all one with division.
Roots become generating spores for the purposes
of argument, or discharge the functions of ova.
^ The obvious fact that space is ' internal
'
precisely as much—
or little—as it is 'external' is, strangely enough, ignored. We
might as well treat the spatial as 'upward' while using 'downward'
for the non-spatial.
l6
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A spectre becomes a spirit. The world of ex-
perience, and our every thought about it, have
ultimately a
'
solid basis,' from which they must
never move on pain of destruction. Light is
dangerous, and must not be thrown upon the
origin or reason of Belief, which is, of course,
the same thing as Faith. What you have^ from
a house to a skin, a prejudice, and a self, is what
you are. Pursue materialism, spiritism, pessi-
mism, and all forms of rigid orthodoxy to their
ultimate end, you will always find the implicitly
false mental image, source of the false linguistic
image. You will always find a remediable
ocular defect in a ' seeing
'
mind, which is
presumably no more perfect than its physical
analogue the eye, but which is, like that, able to
assist in
rectifying the data of touch, smell, and
hearing, and even those rightly or wrongly
resulting from its own activity.
VI
Professor Karl Pearson long ago submitted that
in consequence of the fetishistic use of the terms
matter, mass, motion, force, space, time, cause,
atom, body, law, etc. (especially in text-books),
physical science has made a false start. But the
biologist, the physiologist, the psychologist have
all been dependent on such terms, since no
others were current when they adopted their
terminology ; and have taken them perforce in
untenable and misleading senses. In these senses
they have everywhere used them both directly
and figuratively, and have passed them on into
literary and popular usage. Therefore, if Prof.
Pearson's position is capable of being maintained
even in the broadest sense, Psychology and
Ethics have so far made a false start also. It
follows that their premisses are liable to vanish
along with the superannuated connotations of
the main-artery terms of physical science. At
all events, if the modern scientist is compelled to
use the old terms—taking them over as Chemistry
i8
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took over the terms of Alchemy, as Astronomy
took over the terms of Astrology— due care
should be taken to charge them publicly with
new meanings, and so bring the popular mind
into effective relation with its own
vocabulary.
Owing to this not having been done, the popular
mind to-day is still largely steeped in the logic of
magic, and yet seldom suspects it. And perhaps
most where it least suspects it. For the securest
stronghold of myth is just the mind which, in
the name of common sense, refuses to question
its own certainties.
Let a single example be cited of the way in
which the so-called common-sense mind, starting
from a
misconception of the facts, confidently
uses this misconception as the source of analogies
and metaphors to which it gives authoritative
and directive significance. Our eyes, as science
now tells us, are
" focussed to infinity." It is
their nature to look away : the distant vision is
more germane to them (and us) than the inspec-
tion of things minute or immediately near.





from quite a different conception of the facts, and
draws a corresponding inference. It assumes a
morbid shortsightedness as normal. It supposes
that the hard thing, the effort, the strain, is to
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look far away, to look beyond this or that
' limit
'
: that our eyes are
' formed ' to see
with least trouble the things close to us, and
therefore are most properly occupied with these
things. And so the false premiss gets translated,
by the fatal process of false metaphor, into a
common-sense and unanswerable protest against
every tendency to any kind of
" transcendental-
ism " as being futile, a foolish attempt to reverse
the wholesome order which makes the near
world within touch or grasp our business, fits
the mind for that, and condemns us to stretch
and strain painfully if we would look towards
what is beyond our reach ;—that is, our arm-
stretch.
Here, then, we have an instance of how the
use of analogy and metaphor derived from a false
view of the facts may result in an effective
arrest or more mischievous misdirection of
thought, and so in a further and deeper obscuration
of truth.
A reference to the function of the rods and
cones, as the receivers of light, would afford
another instructive instance of useful analogy
excluded and lost to us by the persistence of
phrases which perpetuate the effects of earlier
ignorance. But, indeed, the same testimony and
lesson occurs throughout all our thinking. We
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are always appealing to facts to furnish us with
illustrations, and we are right in doing so. But
if our appeal is really to a mere fancy which we
are treating as a fact ; if we seriously take the
centaur as we take the ' horse
'
and the * man,'
and use its supposed movements as the analogues
of something we want to illustrate, arguing from
the one to the other as though a
* man-horse '




; then, of course, we
re-import into our reasoning, by a misuse of
expression, the very errors and fallacies which
reason is chiefly occupied in exposing and
removing.
If we appeal to a centaur at all, it must be as
a fabulous monstrosity used to illustrate some-
thing else monstrous. But we too often use
' facts
'
of the centaur, or satyr, or dragon, or
phoenix class, whereby to express the reasonable,
the congruous, the orderly, the real ; for
instance, matter, force, spirit, cause, etc. in their
popular or inherited sense. They create diffi-
culties which else would not exist.
VII
We always tend unconsciously to make what-
ever we have expressed in images and through





original which we took as illustration or in
analogy. Hence results endless confusion, the
real source of which is not detected, and is
therefore permitted to continue its mischievous
work.
Take our use of Inner and Outer as meta-
phorical expressions of the mental and physical.
Through the influence of that usage we in-
stinctively try to make our minds, our ideas
and thoughts, behave as if they were shut up
inside definite bounds, that is, as if they were
objects in space. Hence a false psychology, and
educational ideals and methods that aim at
the development— or production— of thinking
machines, from which you grind out any desired
product, coupled with a thought-cabinet with
innumerable drawers, a thought-cupboard with
innumerable shelves and cavities.
22
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But sometimes this tendency is overcome in
some related metaphor, which has to be forced
into harmony with the falsity thus produced.
E.g. we speak of introspection, of looking into
our own consciousness, etc. The mental eye
which looks inward is so far assumed, for the





of its being mental and so (ex hypothest)
' inner.'
But biology knows of no visual organs which
introspect, which turn on an axis or are fixed,





But having settled that the mental world
exists inside some kind of containing outline,
we have to invent impossible mental eyes that
look inward before we can use the ' intro-
spective method.' No wonder science protests
against that method, though she does not seem
to realise the initial reason for such protest.
Take again the Basis and Foundation. We
try to consider things which are really—like






that. But all * foundation
'
on which we build
has no security for itself save a deeper layer
under it, and beyond that—nothing, or the
ether.
VIII
Among the many defeating absurdities of current
imagery perhaps that of
' laws of nature ' is
one of the worst. One would really think some-
times that nature had primordially summoned
councils and decreed laws, or even brought
in a bill in some Natural Assembly, discussed
it, passed it, clause by clause, carefully defining
its regulations and penalties ! And one would
think that nature's lawyers and judges ex-
pounded or laid down her laws and enforced
her decrees, imposing the statutory penalties
for their infringement. For, of course, we are
supposed to 'break' nature's 'laws'— though
the idea is as grotesque as it would be to
suppose that we can break the
' law ' of
identity and difference, or the
' law ' that
2 + 2 = 4.
It may be said, and is constantly said in
similar cases, that the image being a mere
convenience, no one is misled by it. That is
surely in all cases a profound error. True that
24
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— our whole system of
references to man's relation to nature, to the
ethical import of reality in the widest sense—
betray the fact that we are all the more
dangerously misled because we have no suspicion
of being so. Witness the much-confused and
morbid optimism and pessimism which is the
final outcome of our supposed observing, keeping,
or breaking of nature's
" laws." What to one
of us seems a faultless legislative system, one
by means of which discovery and exploitation
of the universe by man becomes possible, to
another seems a system of
' inhuman ' tyranny
and ruthless coercion, involving cruel and sense-
less waste of power, and outrage upon life. One
man flies in despair to the
'
supernatural,'
while another sets his teeth and tries to con-
vince himself that he lives under an absolute




; subject like the
'
material ' to immut-
able laws from which there is no escape, since
an automatic policeman stands, or a patent lock
is fixed, at every gate by which he might pass
out into freedom and the larger, better, and
more justly-ordered life which he has ideally
conceived.
IX
A FEW examples may here be noted of a kind of
metaphorical usage which oftener tends to throw
dust in our eyes than to throw light on any
subject, starting as it does from veiled fallacy
or false assumption, now discredited by growing
experience or widening and increasingly exact
knowledge.
As we have already seen, the use of Internal
and External, Inner and Outer, Within and
Without, Inside and Outside, as means of
contrasting mind and body, consciousness and
nature, psychical and physical, thought and
reality, is radically misleading. So also is the
use of basis and foundation to express a primary
or ultimate need ; and, in lesser degree, the use
of ground and root for the same purpose. The
first introduces in all sorts of connections the
fallacies of primitive cosmogony.
' Ground ' is
only needed for standing, walking, dancing upon ;
for planting in or building or mining, very
rarely for grasping or holding. Roots, again,
26
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only belong to a plant stage of existence, and are
sent down to obtain nourishment and give a grip,
or hold, for the plant. Yet all these are used
indiscriminately as though they covered or illus-
trated the v^^hole range of accessible realities and
characteristic experiences of Man. There is, in
fact, the v^hole scheme of material, substantial,
static analogy and metaphor for the psychical or
mental or intellectual (or
'
spiritual ') sphere.
There are, again, the metaphors— rather,




criterions of time, space, etc. ; or
on an ' absolute
'
cosmical centre, and on ' im-
passable
'
gulfs which split up the whole fabric
of experience and the inclusive sum of knowledge
into isolated fragments, and thus bring into




it may be, dependent on the prevalent confusion
between distinction and division or separation.


















view,' etc. ; these, again, all used indiscrimin-
ately as covering the whole field of experience,
and of equal illustrative value in every connec-
tion. In all these cases the effect of the attempt
to give to strictly limited or specific images an
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almost universal prevalence and application is,
that their real value in use— the value which
they might yield in intellectual use—is largely
forfeited, and we are not even aware of the loss.
Finally, there is the imagery which gives
peculiar sanction and almost sacredness to the
straight line produced to infinity, though no one
has ever seen it there. But of the tolerated
inanities of superseded analogy there is indeed
no limit.
XWe all
"compound for sins we are inclined to,
By damning those we have no mind to." Thus





animistic and mythical beliefs of our forefathers
regarding the nature of things. Yet all the
while we retain these very associations in our
inherited language, the surface-sense only being
altered, and the old associations being un-
consciously but coercively called up in the
'
subconscious ' region whence come the most
powerful of our impulses and tendencies, since
there acts not merely the individual but the Race
whose tradition he carries.
At any rate our ancestors did not do that.
Their expressions called up the associations then
valid, and their metaphors entirely harmonised
with their supposed realities and facts. The
difference between then and now is that our
metaphors are divorced from our facts ; and
this often involves worse confusion than the
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wildest fetishism, or when it does not, defeats
us by excluding that appeal to association which
is the very optic nerve of thought as reflecting
reality.
XI
What a new mental world we should enter if
we learned to pause in the act of using imagery,




figurative habits ! What dis-
coveries we should make as to why some true
and fruitful thought is so unwillingly received
or is even rejected with protest by those to
whom we should have expected it especially to
appeal ! We refer these effects now to ' cussed-
ness
'
in things or in human nature ; but then




is rather in our barbaric speech than in the
mind to which it gives such distorted expression.
Then would come an era in which, instead of
begging our reader not to take our imagery
seriously, not to apply its implications, but to
regard them as incidental excrescences of con-
ventional expression, we should rather bid him,
in certain cases, to lay these implications to
heart for all they were worth or could
yield.
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We could safely afford to do so ; for then we
should select the imagery which is to convey
our meaning with the same scrupulous dis-
crimination which the jeweller, the surgeon, or
the electrician uses in selecting the implements
for the finest processes of his work. Our
analogies then would not only
' hold water '—
pure water from the well of truth— but they
would ' stand fire '—the hottest fire of criticism
or the crucible of test. They would work in all
senses
;
not only as being consistently applicable,
but as rendering profitable service ; indicating
rich harvests, pointing the way to fresh lines of
inquiry and modes of interpretation. The more
they were analysed the more they would suggest
and convey as their implications came into
view.
True that the
reality and the image can
seldom if ever entirely coincide, that the most
felicitous illustration stops short somewhere and
fails to ' cover the whole ground.' But if the
indirect mode of expression, so often the only
one available for conveying the most precious
and vital truths of life, were gradually assimilated
to a world of order instead of remaining a
tolerated chaos, we should all be taught betimes
to recognise the limits of comparison or parallel.
When in doubt, we should ask whether this or




presses an analogy too far,'
and whether some other
analogy, equally apt,
would bear ' pressing
'
farther, and so bring us
a step nearer to the truth.
XII
To give one out of the mass of illustrations
needed : Suppose a man engaged in controversy
says,
"
I take my stand upon that fact." Three
questions may arise.
(i) Does he mean what he says? That is,
does he really intend to convey the image which
the words express ? If so, we might go on to
ask, how does one " take one's stand upon
"
a
fact t Is one found invariably trampling it, or is
it always under one's heel ? Does one never
move with regard to it, so as to look at it or use
it, especially in an argument ?
(2) Is he telling us the actual truth, or is it
on some other fact, unavowed or unrecognised,





(3) Is he figurating accurately, that is,
appropriately and thus helpfully ?
The last question is hardly ever asked, and
yet it is the key to the other two.
For suppose that another man in the same
controversy
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*
fact.' Then in any case if the figure is
accurate—that is, appropriate— they can never
meet or even approximate, and to the argument
there v^ill be no end.




departure from that point," or
"
I start on that
line," and the second replies,
" And I from (or
on) this other"—then the possibility of deflection
at least comes in, to help them to a solution or
agreement. For alter direction in either case,
and the lines may sooner or later meet at one
point, perhaps at several ; or the two may even
run for a little w^ay together. Then they may
once more diverge—or they may cross.
Now, will any one deny that the latter is a
better image than the former for what we
require in discussion ? that is, a more helpful
type of image for mental process, incident, and
purpose ?
Generalising, we may say : Grant but the
idea of motion—the minimum intellectual pos-
tulate in a moving world—and there is always
the hope, and almost the certainty, of the most
widely divergent
'
views ' or ways of putting
it consistent with reason and fact meeting
somewhen, somewhere. And meanwhile their
* holders ' may have traversed a whole universe
of assimilable experience. Not, we will hope.
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as a rolling stone gathering no moss, but as the
little creature which gathers silica as it creeps,
to form an exquisite shell-home. Or, better
still, as the amoeba ingests and transforms food,
new substance for its own vital growth, acquired
by sensitive contact with the nutritive reality
around it.
XIII
Upon the whole, therefore, it may be truly said
that imagery, as we are content to use it, is liable
to be insane in two senses : in the sense of
raving, and in the sense of waste. In the first
place, it is as though we were shouting at random
and talking nonsense ; in the second, as though
we were throwing food out of the window
and money into the sea. The two combined
represent sheer and cruel loss and paralysis of
thought.
Paralysis of thought. For do what we will,
we cannot escape the law which unites, as in our
very eye, image and object, reflection and reality,
sign and what it signifies, figure and the figurate,
and, generally, token or symbol and what they
stand for. Those of us who consciously think
pictorially are so far more or less able to realise
the gravity and extent of this insidious danger.
But those of us who do not are in far worse
case. They do not even receive automatic
warning of the mischief going on. And the
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difficulties which their thinking presently en-
counters are of course traced to the wrong
source— probably charged to Nature or to
human ignorance, or to the innate perversity of
original principles. But it is needless to defend
Nature, which presents problems, as it were, in
order that we may learn how simply they may
be solved
;
while as to original principles, we
may complain of their innate perversity when
we have begun to agree as to what they are.
And as to human ignorance, that is scarcely a
valid excuse, so long as we do our best to pre-
serve such ignorance, both by the tolerated mis-
fits of imagery in actual use, and by the neglect
to provide for a constantly growing adequacy
of language : not merely through accretion of
new words, but also through the drastic critique
of imagery and the resulting acquirement of
more fitting idioms, figures, and expressive forms
in general.
It is part of the same costly folly to allow,
as we do, such daily additions in slang and
popular talk as tend to create fresh confusion.
And this is the more reprehensible, because both
slang and popular talk, if intelligently regarded
and appraised, are reservoirs from which valuable
new currents might be drawn into the main
stream of language— rather perhaps armouries
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from which its existing powers could be con-
tinuously re-equipped and reinforced.
The poet very largely shares with the'
scientist the responsibility of maintaining and
worsening the evil tradition of unsound and
therefore insane imagery. For instance, when
Mr. William Watson writes of " foundations in
the world's heart," he deserves to undergo such
a world's experience and to have figurative
foundations in his own figurative heart ! For
foundations—we must hope of solid and im-
movable stone, or preferably of impermeable
concrete—in a physical heart would be more
fatal even than ossification. In truth, Nature
seems to have taken a deserved vengeance,
and left us to the solid stone basis or founda-
tion on which we are always, out of place,
insisting ; left us to talk portentously of Life,




(from our fixed foundations) !
and therefore must be a mere aggregate of
cemented bricks or stones with no nexus but
cement.
Considering all these things, the question
suggests itself. Can we be fully alive yet ? Have
we even a glimmering of the Sense of which
we talk so vaguely and confusingly ? Do we so
much as suspect what such a Sense as ours ought
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to be, and do, and preserve us from ? Do we
ever dream of the almost Utopian results which
must accrue when the sense of our symbols
becomes really fitting ; when we find really
good sense and common sense, and are sensitive
in the best sense, in our estimate and treatment
of the cardinal questions of that expression on
which alike depend practical activities and the
thinking which alone controls, directs, interprets,
applies, and utilises them ?
There is need of some great poet to write
worthily, from a fresh view-point, on the Power
of the Word—the word which we blow about
as though it were but chaff, gravely explaining
indeed that it is ' merely word,' and so implicitly
of no moment. But our use of words is never
that
;
for whether positive or negative, excessive
or deficient, present or absent even, our words
are of moment always.
" For the first time,"
says a recent writer,
" there swept over him
that awful sense of unavailing repentance for the
word said which might so well have been left
unsaid, which most human beings are fated to
feel at some time of their lives." Aye ; but
the author should have included the word unsaid^
which has often helped or hindered, and in all
human ways signified so much. Indeed, that
word ' merely
'
is constantly misused and per-
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haps never more so than in conjunction with
*
verbal.' Let us tread softly with our merelys,
onlys, simplys . . . and use them with fear
and trembling. Yet even in silence there is no
escape for us either from danger or duty. Silence
is often a most significant declaration, and a most
misleading one.
There is but one safety ; and that is, to realise
as we have never done yet what we are doing
with speech, and what with significant silence.
And we have to realise vitally, intimately,
actively, the power of symbol not only in
Word, as in legend, narrative, parable, name,
and all social speech and all intellectual discus-
sions
;
but also in act, as in ritual, ceremony,
performance, posture, dance. There has been
as yet no adequate, no thorough, no logical and
scientific attempt on the widest basis to deal
with this central interest of man's expression and
realisation of himself and the world through
Symbol ; no attempt, with this paramount object
in view, to wed the sacred and the secular, the
emotional and the intellectual domains and
examples. But indeed it cannot be adequately
done until we know what the Word really is ;
until at long last we begin worthily to speak ;
until we understand that the Word may be, as
in our usage it often is, a mere articulate sound
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with a mean sense, a capricious, idle, abusive
meaning,— or, as also a Child, a Son, a Divine
Messenger, and Reason itself are bearers and
expressions of the Significance of life.
XIV
Can we even appraise the value of the Symbol ?
Can v^^e, say by any effort of imagination, place
ourselves at the standpoint of the unfortunate in
the limbo of the Asymbolic, hungering and
yearning for the Sign that gives significance,
albeit with no likeness to itself, yet giving us the
world of the indicated and implied ; signalling
the messages which are there to be interpreted
and to be acted upon as rousing, drawing, re-
assuring, or warning us ?
We know something of the thirst of the
excluded when, loving the holy, we know
ourselves unholy ; when, looking up with in-
tellectual reverence to knowledge and the will
and power to wield it— to the creative or
victorious energy of the leader, the man we
call great
—we know ourselves ignorant, supine,
indifferent in comparison ; stupid or silly, super-
ficial, or (as we say of the hardminded) common-
place and unresponsive.
Well, at least it is something to know ourselves
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all that and worse. For who is thus confessing
and lamenting ? That is a divine discontent.
But sharper than all the pangs of such perception,
sadder even than such sense of humiliation and
banishment, would be the pangs of the prisoner
of the asymbolic limbo looking up with infinite
longing and yearning at the treasures we so
amazingly disregard, or abuse and despise.
All other powers have come under the higher
brain of Man
;
that wonderful enabling instru-
ment of orderly creation which does for mind
what so-called Law, conceived of as a marshalling
and directive principle in the physical world,
may be pictured as doing for motion and matter.
But the real power of symbol in its articulate
and logical form ; the real function of the word
in this sense
;
the power of sense itself, of mean-
ing itself, and of that significance which is pre-
eminently the glory of speech : this power is as
yet practically in abeyance and almost pitiably
ignored. For we are all guilty of or tolerate in
this matter a dereliction, an ignoration and a
waste which we should not suffer to continue
for a day in any other case of vital importance
or even of interested curiosity.
XV
It might be useful (and there may be more
warrant for it than we know) if we were to
regard the physical world as a complex acted
metaphor of the mental world, and both as
essentially expressive of a common nature.





which admits of being used in a wide sense, as
poets and philologists both know and teach us.
May it be, then, that as our eyes reverse the
position of external objects and the brain has to
restore it : as our consciousness gives as at least
world-wide, the field of view which is in reality
no larger than the eye itself: so in fact does
Nature speak to us in a language of unerringly





does : manifesting her doings
gradually to our growing intelligence through
what we call ' sense,' but keeping a margin of
reserve in her yet undiscovered or unrelated
secrets ? May it be that our ' speech
'
is but
an awkward, half-adjusted, and therefore confused
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and ambiguous rendering or re-presentation of
the irrefutable eloquence of natural phenomena ?
We look to the material for metaphors of the
mental
;
we trace up most words and phrases—
perhaps all
—to the physical. But we are also
constrained to reverse this process : we find e.g.
that emotional terms best picture and help us
to realise some qualities in physical nature. And
in fact does not the physical world require the
mental world as that whereby to represent itself,
as we know that the red rose requires the light
for its redness, while in its turn the light is only





? Supposing that we per-
sonified Nature in a scientific sense, postulating
her as a unified series of impressions, would she
now be found speaking of us in a metaphor as
we of her, only with speech reversed ? That is,
would her every
' word ' be taken metaphorically
from the action or process of consciousness,
reason, reflection, judgment ? Thus might we
not say that motion, and mass, and the so-called
* matter
'
assumed as behind them, are as full of
mind-metaphor as mind is of matter-metaphor ;
the mind-metaphor arising in the conscious world,
and reaching us through intelligence, and intellect,
as matter- metaphor arises in the unconscious
world, and reaches us through sense ?
XVI
Whether we see it under that aspect or
another, the fact remains that not only Nature
in the ordinary sense of the term, but also these
human constructions which consist in adaptation
of Nature's properties and material to the use
and service of man, are all charged with poten-
tial metaphor of the highest illustrative value.
For the sake of an instance, let us consider the
familiar allegorical way of speaking of human
life as a voyage.
We speak of steering our way or navigating
our course in the " voyage of life." With this
we contrast the rudderless drifting which ends
in wreck, or at least reaches no harbour, and
lands in no port or goal at all, the sailors on
the awful deeps of life. We image in our
minds the sudden hurricane, the impenetrable
fog, the persistent gale, the heavy seas, which
are to try the soundness of our life - ship's
timbers, the training and seamanship of her
officers and crew, and her general seaworthiness.
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We recognise the need, not only of efficiency,
but of knowledge—and that not merely ter-
restrial, but cosmical—if we would attain, with
the least possible delay or danger, the haven at
which we would arrive. And last, we picture
to ourselves the rugged coasts, the sunken rocks,
the hidden reefs, the entangling weeds of the
shallow waters to which the track of most of
us is confined, and which in any case confront
us in more or less threatening forms at both
ends of our voyage, as well as at intermediate
calling-places.
And now, let us ask those who are our
beacon-givers in the world of earth and water
for such facts as may afford, at least, not false or
merely fanciful, but true -to -nature illustrations
of what the beacon-givers of mind and conscience
ought to bring us for help in our life-voyage.
Here are some answers received from one
source out of many, A Chapter on Lighthouse
Work^ by the late Professor Tyndall.^ In the
first place, let us note that
The atmosphere through which the rays have to pass from
the Hghthouse to the mariner is the truest photometer. The
opacity of the atmosphere is entirely due to suspended matter,
foreign to pure air. . . . Atmospheric opacity is not due to
^
It must not be supposed that an instance like this one is
exceptionally valuable. The wealth of illustrative material that
really illustrates and yet is never utilised is little suspected.
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absorption^ but to the waste of the light in echoes from the
particles on which the light-waves impinge.





(or denseness) of mind which









— is due to " suspended matter









been thought, but only borrow^ed by those who
hold them. And this, too, is not due to ' absorp-
tion,' which may, so to speak, store up that
energy which again may take the form of heat
or even light, but to the waste of intellectual
and moral force in echoes (or reflex beams) even
from a reflective mind or sensitive conscience,
when encumbered with much dusty detail,
orderless or crowded.
Secondly, let us observe the gain in power
(for beacon-work) from the depth of a light-
giving flame.
It is depth alone that confers upon the flame its augmented
intensity when used in a revolving apparatus. In this case
eight luminous strata send their Hght simultaneously in the
same direction to the lens, the hinder strata radiating through
the layers of flame in front of them.
So, even when we do find minds which give
out light, how thin, and thus how weak to
penetrate, it mostly is ! How true we feel the
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principle to be, that if revealing power is to
come, and mariners be safely guided on their
way, there must be layers of flame of which
the inner ones shall radiate through the outer.
And even that is not the only need ; for
' lateral divergence
'
must be given to the rays,
else much will still remain in outside shadow,
of which we need a warning right and left.
But all we yet have reached by our means of




In the material beacon this " gives the im-





actively exerting itself to warn
"
and guide.
And what, after all, is life ? Has it not been
said to be, in some sense,
" latent in a fiery
cloud " ? Why may it not have affinity of
some kind (through consciousness) with light ?
^
To quote again :
A point connected with physiological optics deserves men-
tion here. The optic nerve is partially and rapidly paralysed
by light ; and the value of the group-flashing light is enhanced
by the fact that during the intervals of darkness the eye in
great part recovers its sensibility and is rendered more appreci-
ative of the succeeding shock. The suddenness of the illumina-
tion and the preparedness of the retina are points to which I
always attached importance. The thrilling of distant lightning
through dense clouds suggests an idea to be aimed at in
^ Since this was written, electricity has brought life and light
into very close relation.
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experiments of this character. . . . The more I think of it,
and the more I experiment upon it, the more important does
this question of flashes appear to me. ... It is its suddenness
that renders the lightning flash so startlingly vivid through a
cloud. . . .
Too seldom do we try to translate facts like
these into the dialect of mind-vision. The
sight-nerves of our mind get numbed and dulled
by that continuous light impression which we
ignorantly treasure. An interval of darkness we
abhor
;
a time of shadow is to us a horror. We
even strive to nullify its service, insisting on
persistent, unbroken light from whatever source,
of whatever quality, without one respite to the
tired mind-eves : and then we shake our heads
and cry,
" We cannot see
;
at least there is
nothing visible, we are sure of that." And yet
the pause may be the means of better seeing—
may be the actual secret of the keenest sight
we have. The law of rhythm claims obedience
thus
;
each self and all the race must say. Amen.
And let us bear in mind that ' laws ' like this
act through vast ages of development. A week
or even a thousand years of darkness may mean,
to race or unit, one vibration. What matter, if
to rested eyes light flashes, coming when they
can use it to good purpose, revealing, making
clear, the ways of life ?
XVII
There are few things more unintelligent, because
wasteful where economy is especially needed,
than our use of certain popular metaphors.
This is one of the many cases in which present
education, as it were, permits notorious and re-
movable obstacles to block the path of mental
advance, or connives at the true lines of that
advance being constantly warped. The result is
something fairly equivalent on the mental plane
to mis-pronunciation and mis-spelling on the
social one.
We rightly correct with care these last
tendencies, not merely as a matter of custom, but
also because neither ignorance nor neglect of
rule, nor peculiarities of dialect, however racy in
their effect, must be allowed to complicate the
unanimity and ease of intercourse. Having
corrected slipshod usage in matters of sound and
form, we proceed to grammar, and replace
caprice or disorder by consistency and order ;
explaining always that not merely custom but
52
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economy and expressiveness are at stake. Finally,
we add some training in at least elementary logic,
sufficient for the conduct of social life and think-
ing at various given levels of requirement or use.
One may venture, indeed, to think that some
of these precautions are too rigidly taken ; that
expressiveness, apt, fitting, pungent, illuminative,
illustrative, suggestive, is often needlessly sacri-
ficed by our hastily denouncing instead of
adopting some apt and significant idiom or
accent or spelling of unsophisticated dialects, or
of the child's spontaneous speech. But then, if
we did in that direction seek to enrich, economise,
and invigorate language, we should have to be
careful in so doing to make it less cumbersome,
less wordy, less pedantically formulative than
popular speech frequently is. We must see that
our contributions neither impoverish nor sacrifice
quality in accumulating a larger choice ; that
they lessen neither dignity, grace, nor delicacy.
Even the whimsical, when admitted, must be
obviously subservient to the one great need and
rule : concentrated, apt, effective, and terse
expressiveness. When usage has been made as
flawless as we can make it, beauty must inevit-




before the musician can entrance
us or even attract us by his playing.
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Now, in this sphere of imagery, analogy,
metaphor, trope, etc.— in short, of linguistic
comparison, reflection, parallel, or likeness—we
find one of the most notable examples of our
inconsistency. Whereas we press convention
and formality into a rigid
* board- school ' or
' academic ' mould, and risk loss on this side,




—of the fact that we are liable to
be powerfully swayed by the unintentional sug-
gestions of language ; as when the common or
direct use of a word or phrase infects, so to
speak, its analogical or metaphorical use.
Our analogical use of the terms solid ground,
basis, foundation, has been already dealt with,
but is worth considering more closely. Nothing
can be more interesting or educative than the
racial history of the stress we lay on these
physical facts and the mental use we make of
them. Nothing can be more admirable than
the service they can and often do render. But
it is none the less lamentable that for many
generations teachers should, instead of leading
in the path of rational linguistic advance, have
followed fortuitous degenerative usage, and
perpetuated actual ignorance of facts, actual
confusion of thought, in the use of analogies of
this kind. Before the days of Galileo, as it
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must be remembered and insisted on, the use of
solid ground, basis, and foundation, as figures of
universal and primary necessity, or of ultimate
security, was entirely justified. The earth itself
was assumed to be securely founded ; and its
being detached from its basis and set whirling in
space was the last thing which there was any
reason to fear. Solid ground was the need of the






Well, so it still is for us men. We must
have a firm substratum to stand and yet more to
build upon. To build ? yes : with wood, brick,
stone, or concrete, our shelters, defences, huts,
towns. All must be as firmly founded as the
tree is rooted.
Yet even now we are making aeroplanes, not
merely geoplanes ; and daily inventing fresh
means of speeding through air without touch of
earth or water. Therefore, we have less excuse
than ever for forgetting the secure and powerful
flight of the bird, or the fact that the earth on
which we build so heavily rests, or rather floats,
more safely on the bosom of space than a soap-
bubble on the air. And when the time comes
when some of us shall work and practically live
in the air in some roomy air-boat anchored in
our garden, and only descend to solid earth for
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food or other need, we may then, perhaps,
recognise practically what science has long ago
announced to us, that the ultimate ' foundations
'
of all visible power are neither builded nor built
upon, but are sources of energy and centres of
force, the suns and atoms of the cosmos. And
recognising this, we shall perhaps permit the
fact to have its proper influence, not only on our
views of life, but on our ways of expressing that
and ourselves.
XVIII
















reality are bandied about, some-
times vi^ith literary skill, sometimes merely as
controversial weapons, sometimes as conventions
handed down by those who meant to convey by
them conceptions or assumptions which are now
either obsolete or greatly changed in bearing.
Correspondingly, terms like Nature, matter,
force, mass, spirit, mind, and much current
image, metaphor, and analogy are used in
undetected confusion and a welter of defeating
inconsistency. Instead of being informed,
directed, enlightened by them— which is the
purpose that each of them was originally made
to serve—we have either to think away their
inherited associations, which is really an addition
to the labour of thinking, or else to allow our
most momentous conclusions to be vitiated by
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them. What such vitiation costs us is to be
seen in the present enormous waste of exposition
and controversy as well as in difficulties and
deadlocks actually created by the lack of a real
consensus in the quest and achievement of an
adequate, consistent, ever intensifying and ex-
panding Expression.
If we realised the situation and acted upon it,
the results must at first appear miraculous, like
recovery of sight by the lifelong blind ; or
rather, perhaps, like the exploits of the primitive
kindlers of fire and constructors of weapons,
tools, boats, wheels, etc., and of grammatical
language itself, who were the real leaders of
the race.
But for this very reason it is easier at present
to take concrete cases, in which the choice is
bewilderingly wide, since we are
"
all in the
same boat." From one end to the other in our
speech and writing we have the too futile
complaint that this or that obsolete convention
or current custom compels us here, hinders us
there, in ways which ought not to be tolerated
for a moment. And the complaining author
himself inevitably, though in varying degrees,
falls into the trap which he is denouncing.
Undoubtedly we are all in the same boat.
For the critic who writes from the point of view
SIGNIFICS AND LANGUAGE 59
of Signifies, that is, from the really expressive,
descriptive and interpretative standpoint, has fre-
quent occasion to remember that he has no other
means of protest and exposition than current
language, the very one which so urgently calls for
them. All that is said or written, therefore, by the
significian, is necessarily itself subject to the very
criticism which he brings and urges. And, mean-
while, the literary expert or the artist in verbal
expression only reveals by his mastery of phrase
or his brilliant use of imagery or comparison,
and by the ease, dignity, and harmonious flow of
his diction, how much more we might hope for
if his powers were really set free, and his readers
trained to welcome what, as working in a purified
and enriched medium, he could give us.
XIX
Stories used to be told of a man who always
explained to his servants that
" when I ask for
a corkscrew I mean a carving-knife." One
knows now that this is quite a common form of
memory disease. But we all virtually do this
without the warning ! We take for granted
that the needed shift—the tacit " he does not
mean what he says but the other unsaid thing
"
— is automatically made, as no doubt to some
extent it is.
But why, in this world of crowding obstacle
to a clear mental path, do we tolerate even the
minutest avoidable barrier to the smooth and
swift running, in coupled order, of thought and
speech ? It is just as cheap and easy to use the
root image or the foundation image or other like
ones in the case where they do fit, and some
other image or figure where they don't, as it is
to persist in a falsifying usage. Any one who
has learnt to notice these things may many
a time detect in conversation the sub-attentive
60
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results of leaving our linguistic instrument out
of tune. What should we say to a violin player
who smiled and said, What does it matter that
my instrument isn't tuned ? You all know what
note I mean to play ; you can all by habit set It
right or ignore it. And the same excuse avails
for the player of a false note, which may easily




" O, he does not mean F
sharp but F flat !
"
Doubtless too many of us
have defective ears in this sense, and both commit
and tolerate much discord without knowing it.
But still, the commonest strummer who wrote or
printed a jingle, and then played It, would be
pulled up by his hearers if he not only used flats
and sharps and other notes indiscriminately, but
justified it by saying,
"
Nobody is misled !
"
These things are all convention, and one note
does as well as another if it is accepted as the
proper thing.
And it is true that these things, in musical
composition or rendering, do little harm beyond
tormenting the sensitive ear. The practical
world goes on placidly while we play sharp for
flat, and accepts the one for the other. But the
corresponding state of things in all expression ;
the obscurity and ambiguity of our expressive
score, the use In language of a (perhaps faintly)
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discordant note or a half-tuned instrument—even
though passably right to an artificially dulled ear
—that is an unthinkable loss to the interests and
the powers of Man, whose ideal, surely, is to be
embodied harmony, like the normal organism,
and consciously faultless Expression. Discord in
this domain does not merely torture the mental
analogue of a musical ear. It makes for mental
confusion and obstruction
;
it needlessly adds to
difficulties already serious enough, and lessens
the too scanty treasure of illuminative thought
and communicative power.
Even at the best we can do and think and
say too little that is really worth while in
the fullest sense. Our noblest eloquence is
confessed by the worker, thinker, poet, to fall
short of a true mark. But we are profoundly
stirred
; great and wise and beautiful things are
conveyed to us, and we rise in response beyond
the self of commonplace with which we have
no right to be content. Only, that response is
unconsciously impoverished and even distorted
by quite avoidable drawbacks, which we not
only complacently tolerate but teach to children,
thus ensuring their permanence and stifling the
instinct of right expression which, though in
quaint forms, shows itself clearly in the normal
child until successfully suppressed. And though
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we do now and then recoil from a glaring
misuse of term in the '
rising generation,' and
lament such a lapse from our good ways, we
never see that the fatal seed has been sown, the
fatal tradition of a far more extensive misuse has
been handed on, by us ; that in scores and
hundreds of instances we have
carefully habitu-
ated the child, trained it, to say one thing when
it means another, or to be content to leave much
of language in rags or else cramped by antique
armour.
And, be it remembered, not language only





some painters or com-
posers would apparently make up for the lack of
original genius or freshness of idea, by a deliber-
ate reversion to barbarism or by an elaboration
which is merely artificial and sophisticated.
This tendency, in fact, runs through all forms of
expressive activity
—and is there any form of
activity non-expressive, be it only of the inanity
of the actor ?
XX
The characteristic function of man in the long
evolutionary ascent which he has accomplished
may be described as Translation. In mind that
function has had its work to do, but in the body
its effects are most obviously apparent. Man
has translated wing into arm, paw into hand,
snout into nose. His translations of vital
function and ensuing translations of structure
have indeed been innumerable, inevitable,
triumphant. Why ? Because they were always
ascending adaptations ; because they always
meant readiness to change, to develop, to be
modified, even to atrophy and thus make room, on
occasion, for the purposes of a vital ascent. . . .
Man, then, has been organically and typically
plastic. But his language, except in secondary
senses or for superficial purposes, is still rigid.
If he has any intentions in regard to speech, it
manifestly does not heed them as the paw and
the wing of an earlier day heeded the promptings
of the phyletic will and took new form and
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power. He has never yet been able to secure
the control and direction of that very gift which
most differentiates him from the ' dumb ' world.
Meantime, there are societies and congresses,
national and international, for ensuring the
command and developing the potencies of almost
all the social activities
;
all except the one
which most profoundly affects and should
precede them all. There are reforming move-
ments in every direction except in regard to that
which is their very condition—the power, namely,
of
really expressive and significant definition of
feelings, thoughts, and purposes.
XXI
What, broadly speaking, is the difference
between the most perfect of modern instruments,
machines, apparatus of any kind, and those
organic instruments out of which they have
been developed, or for which they have been sub-
stituted ? The difference consists, for practice,
in their greater precision and accuracy. But
this greater precision and accuracy is always
understood as not restricting but widening the
efficiency of the instrument. As its exquisite
complexity increases, it becomes increasingly
adaptable ; and it automatically stops or even
changes its action when a knot or gap or other
incident in working occurs. It is even said that
when some unfavourable condition occurs which
necessitates the intervention of intelligence, a
bell is sounded which brings the expert. Little
by little the instrument assimilates, by the will
of its maker, some fraction of his own power
of adjustment and of flexibility in providing for
small changes or of averting dangers. In all
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such examples of engine and instrument we
have, in fact, a projection of man's own pre-
rogative of adaptation. Every instrument is,
broadly speaking, an extension of sense and
organic function.
We have still, however, only a constructed
machine, invented and manufactured ; with its
limitations relatively rigid and narrow, however
much they may have in recent years expanded.
It is desirable, therefore, to supplement this ideal
of precision by relating it again with the admitted
evolution of the hand from flipper and paw.
This latter evolution excludes the idea of actual
manufacture and even of a conscious and rational
will. But it implies a form of what may be
called Racial or Phyletic Will, that will which,
profiting by the very existence of favourable
varieties able to rise above and overcome adverse
conditions, makes the work of natural selection
possible.
Now, let us combine these two ideas. Think
of the exquisite delicacy in both cases. Realise
the marvellous subtlety of the response of
violin, microscope, or spectroscope, and of the
even more astonishing instruments which are
almost crowding upon us, and then consider the
consummate skill of the trained hand, free
because determined and because loyal to fact and
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order—and you have some suggestion of what
language is not yet, but has to become. Some-
thing of it, but not all. For Language is Thought
in audible activity.
XXII
But indeed the example which language has to
follow, and its ultimate scope and limitations,
are those of the phenomenal world itself. We
are therein aware, thanks mainly to the work
of science, that there are many processes and
changes going on and things existing round us





In some cases, though we cannot see, hear, or feel
directly, we can do so indirectly ; we can invent
instruments which are sensitive to stimuli to
which we are entirely insensitive. This brings
us an immense extension of our range of sense-
perception. Yet on the other hand, unless
we can either re-acquire forms of excitability
which are found in the animal world—and to
some extent still in the uncivilised world or in
pathological forms—or else evolve fresh response-
power on a still ascending organic spiral, we
must in the last resort be hampered by a
narrowness of sense-range which even threatens
to increase.
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In both respects, that of acquiring command
of an ever more efficient instrument, and that of
intensifying the range of natural awareness, the
world of phenomena accessible to us cannot so
far be said to have translated itself adequately
into our world of words,—into Language. We
experience much that we cannot articulately
express, and therefore cannot usefully study or
record. And why ? Because after all language,
in the present sense of the word, is comparatively
a late acquisition ; and for reasons which can,
though dimly, be discerned, the development of
articulate expression has lagged behind all other
forms of development since its first great advance
in what to us are ' classical ' periods.
And yet the fact of this arrested development,
if we only could see it objectively, as an historical
phenomenon, might well move us to wonder.
For throughout history there has been, appar-
ently, a widely felt instinct that somehow
articulate reasoning—the highest because the
rationally ordered form of response to our environ-
ment and of
analysis of experience—was our
supreme attribute and prerogative. The Greek
Logos is, of course, the most conspicuous instance
of this recognition. But it may be found, I
believe, throughout Oriental tradition and, in
ruder forms, in most types of barbarous and even
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savage myth. It seems strange that man should
so completely have lost sight of the full value of
that to which apparently he has hitherto, in the
more exalted as w^ell as the most primitive
historic phases of his being, rendered instinctive
homage. We shall do well in this context to










speech or writing, yet both forms really apply
to all original conception, and even to all original
'
composition,' not to the literary alone.
XXIII
Language might in one aspect be called articu-
late music. And we may be grateful to the so-
called
stylists, although in their efforts after beauty
they sometimes sacrifice instead of transfiguring
significance, and always tend to defeat themselves
by making significance secondary. For at least
their work recognises some analogy between
the ordered harmony of music which we call
attunement, and the true ideal of language.
And thus we are reminded that as yet language
in ordinary use barely rises above the level of
noise, and only suggests the perfect natural
harmony which ought to be its essential character.
The reason for this, however, is not merely that
in language we have failed to develop a full
control of our ' singing
'
power, or that we are
still content with the rude instruments of ancient
days, although this is to a great extent true.
We may put it in another way and, as already
suggested, may say that in civilised speech we
have acquired linguistic instruments of real com-
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plexity and implicit power to render subtle
forms of harmony, but that it has never occurred
to us to tune them together, to attune them.
And we may suppose ourselves to have told one
who suggested the need of this that the proposal
was pedantic, and that to tune an instrument was
to restrict its scope, as the ambiguity of tone
and conflict of intention which reduces music to
noise means a valuable freedom secured. We
are liberating music by ostracising the tuner,
enriching the language with grunt, squall, yell,
squeal, and excruciating discord !
XXIV
We may experimentally assume that every pro-
cess really ascertained in physiology fits, has its
corresponding process, in psychology. The
danger is that we are not yet advanced enough
to apply safely the translations in detail which
this natural correspondence should make possible
and instructive ; and a mistranslation would be
worse than none. But if the systematic corre-
spondence be postulated, it should follow that
the advance of knowledge in each sphere ought
to contribute towards advance in the other. The
intrinsic unity is perfect ; witness the existence
of psycho-physics, and even the fact that already
language is full of expressions borrowed from
both sides, though usually in the wrong way
and conveying the wrong idea. Its assump-
tions being out of date, too much of it is like
talking of railways and steamer traffic in terms
of horse or bicycle traffic ; even as presently we








terms of tramping and rolling. This is hardly
a caricature.
To some extent, of course, language should
carry on the many traditions of experience.
But a language loaded with dead traditions has
its nerve-channels choked and its reflexes dis-
located, and the ensuing general paralysis results
in a diseased exuberance of expression. Of the
typical expressive diseases, no adequate diagnosis
or even description has yet been made. Most
generally they are of a diffuse, non-acute,
negative kind, analogues of a lov^ or deficient
vitality. Healthy action, sound development
from simple to complex, and thus to a higher
level of simplicity and economy, is usually sup-
pressed in children by their teachers ; so are
spontaneous and needed returns to an early
heritage of pregnantly significant idiom. What
English has lost in this w^ay can only be guessed
at. The epigrams of folk-speech which linguistic
folk-lore collects and preserves afford examples,
and so do the few early narratives we have. But
much can never have been committed to writing,
or been noticed even to be ridiculed !
Meanwhile, to return to our analogy, linguistic
disease in various forms is assiduously imparted
or at best left untreated. We helplessly accept
our general paralysis, our dropsy, our cancer
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of speech ; and the many forms of mental
indigestion which result from indulgence in
unwholesome speech-food are but one type of the
mental ills caused by, and causing, the expres-
sional ills. For the mischief is, of course,
reciprocal.
In one case—that alone called ' bad language
*
—we do realise this ; we do understood the
powerful reaction on mind and character which
forms of speech may involve. But unhappily
bad language, in a wider sense, is imposed upon
our writers and thinkers from the first, and con-
vention chains them to it.
XXV
There can be, of course, no question of the
convenience and economy of using one word in
many senses. The ever-increasing richness and
variety of experience v^ould else make vocabu-
laries impossibly cumbrous. The wealth of
variation in language, far from being an evil, is
a priceless advantage. Outside the region of
technical notation, mechanical precision of out-
line or constancy of content would be both the
cause and sign of arrested growth or decaying
life. What is wanted is to secure that each of us
shall know better where others are, and he himself
is, in the matter of expression ; also that we
shall allow more than we do yet for the general
failure to
classify and appraise the shifting
penumbras which surround the symbols of
thought. We are too apt to assume the true
analogy of language to be a world without
atmosphere in which every outline is clear cut
and sharp ; whereas a truer analogy is that of
the world enveloped in an atmosphere which
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causes outlines to melt and vary, to shift and
disappear, to be magnified, contracted, distorted,
veiled, in a thousand changing conditions. These
changes are not drawbacks or dangers except in
so far as they deceive or baffle ; they are the
reflections of life itself as well as of its home.
And in proportion as we are worthy of the
human name in its highest sense, we are able to
understand the significance of, to allow for, even
to exploit that element of uncertainty, of possible
deception, which thus acts as a powerful stimulant
of the higher cerebral activities. The normal
result of such a stimulation both on the physical
and mental planes is that we learn to interpret,
and to see order and consistency behind, what
have seemed the vagaries of natural hazard.
An assured command of language—one as yet
not even fully possessed by our greatest writers
so long as the immense majority of their readers
have been brought up to misread them or to
read them in incompatible senses—would corre-
spond to that command of mechanical resource
which is the amazing result of the renascence of
the significal function in that one direction.
XXVI
A NECESSARY distinction which is continually
ignored is that between verbal and sensal.^ The
verbal is question of symbolic instrument regarded
as a thing detached and out of actual use ; the
sensal is question of value conveyed thereby on
any particular occasion. The two are at present
hopelessly confused. But no word in actual use
is merely verbal : there and then it is sensal also.
You may have endless variety in the subtle little
tunes or ' airs
'
that we call words or word-
groups, and in the written symbols which again
stand for these
;
but this endless verbal
variety
ought to give us an endless sensal treasure. The
sense and meaning, the import and significance
which language carries or makes possible,
constitute its value. What we call its beauty,
partly a verbal and partly a sensal effect, is,
as already suggested, akin to that of music,
which is much more significant than most of
^ If this word be rejected, wc shall require another : but it
conveys a needed variant from sensible.
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us suppose. Harmony and melody ought to
convey much more to us than they do.
But the idea of conveyance is essentially that
of the biological tradition and transference which
made ascent possible. Some developments of
sense which we had on the animal and doubtless
on the primitively human plane have been lost
through relaxation of the stress of vital need.
Yet in the interests of new mental need we must
even try to regain some of these, while acquiring
fresh ranges of all senses and fresh subtlety of
application. And with this must go, as part of
the same enhancing and vivifying process, fresh
delicacy and force of reasoning and fresh intoler-
ance of the confusion in language at present
unheeded.
XXVII
It seems obvious that mathematics should not




to all practical wants, but that it
should be equally translatable into other and
higher spheres of our common need. But it
cannot do this while language (and especially
while imagery) remains the neglected discord
that it is, even in hands from which one would
expect results which throughout rang as true as
the music drawn from a perfectly adjusted
instrument, and above all from the healthy and
most highly organised human larynx. So far
from leading to or making for pedantry, this
vital command of a perfectly flexible expression
in word as in act would reflect the plastic
powers of the life-impulse itself in all the
richness of its adaptive variation, and would
continually surprise us with fresh forms of truth,
wonder and beauty, in their turn involving, and
in a sense creating, new developments of expressive
achievement. At present we see the promise of
8i G
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this gift almost alone on the emotional and
imaginative side. The poet does on his own
ground surmount the difficulties of language, and
by a sort of miracle arouses in us responses which,
if we dispassionately analysed his method, we
should see to be due to an induced thrill of
sympathetic vibration that must ignore the
obstacle and exploit emotionally the utmost
power of a yet unworthy medium of expression.
But as things are we agree to discount his
message, which indeed fails to reach many at all,
or to touch, with any perfect healing, the deepest
ills, or answer the pregnant questions of life. It
is but too evident, also, that the message of
religion as yet tends rather to accentuate inevit-
able differences than to interpret and gather up
these into an organic richness of response.
Religion, like poetry, comes, as it were, as an
isolated lung or an isolated heart, and language
is largely to blame for the persistence of this
dividing tendency w^hich so effectually breaks up
the normal unity of a sane human wholeness on
its highest levels.
XXVIII
" Language in its present sense," I have said.
For be it confessed at once that I would transcend
the level and limits of mere * language.' A
mere tongue does not satisfy me except as a
necessary compromise—a detail. What we now
call language is but one, the most comprehen-
sive and delicate, mode of expressing ourselves,
of feeling and thinking together, of articulating
our nature, our knowledge, our hopes, our ideals.
All I care for is first and always that Signifi-
cance which is reached through sense and mean-
ing, and which (if you give these free play) must
ultimately involve and induce beauty of sound
and form. I am quite ready for the most drastic
changes as well as for the most scrupulous and
anxious preservation of our existing resources all




I want Esperanto, or rather its worthier successor
when that shall appear. I want the Zulu clicks ;
I want modes of expression as yet unused, though
we must not say undreamt of, since there are
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many scientist's and idealist's diagrams, symbols
and other ' thinking machines,' all ready and in
order, to rebuke us.
It may be true that the larynx and tongue
must remain the main means. Still, you have
refinement of gesture and of expressive action,
the potentialities of w^hich are practically un-





* Morse alphabet,' of
the artist's tools and the laboratory apparatus,
open to you. Let us learn to think in radiations
and in ether waves. Let us transfigure grammar
and prosody. Already the poets give us hints of
the plasticity and beauty and wonder of words.
We analyse, yet we do not touch the secret ; but
why not catch at least some of the infection ?
And let us learn to use machinery in higher ways :
let us annex it to the service of thought, of beauty,
of significance. Let us indeed fearlessly accrete
words and phrases from all forms of science. All
the ancient philosophers whom we revere ab-
sorbed the scientific terminology of their day and
used it seriously and exactly. Still more should
we now do this, when science is giving us not
only rudder and compass, but such turbines of
mind as the world has never seen. Nay, is not
acceleration itself just quickening^ and the whole
of contemporary mechanical development one
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parable ? Language must be regenerated. It
must be re-conceived and re-born, and must grow
to a glorious stature. Of what that may be and
become if only we resolve that it shall be, the
greatest words of the greatest thinkers give us
but a hint. It is quite ready to serve us : it is
only we who are too stupid and vulgar to be
worthy of such waiting-on. We think in the
pigmental, and get our
' colour ' through mud.
Let us think in the spectral, and get our
' colour
'
through the rainbow. The true Word, let us
realise, is not merely a conventional noise or
scrawl or stamp ; it is the Logos, it is Reason.
It is more than that. It is that which can truly
say
*
I am ' : it is the revelation of the Way
through truth to life.
XXIX
The social phenomena of language, observes
M. A. Dauzat,^ are extremely complex. First
synthesis and then analysis defy the inquirer
("est rebelle au chercheur"). But this ought
to be the case no more, as no less, than in any
other kind of research which involves the social
conditions of life. It all depends on how we
tackle the problem. If in any subject of human
study we may accept disorder and caprice as our
masters, calling those enslaving factors the in-
evitable concomitants of ' freedom of will ' and
of an innate tendency to error, of course the
writer's complaint holds good. But it is time
we ceased to make use of the false contrast
between the invariable as mechanical and the
chaotic as voluntary. The will in sound health
has all the trustworthiness of the natural order
and constructed machine, lacking only its indis-
criminative pressure and its senseless persistence
which, dynamically uncontrolled and statically
obstructive, makes for ruin.
1 La Vie du langage^ p. i i .
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The truly sane mind never errs, never swerves
from natural loyalty to the real. It must seek
knowledge and ensue it, else it can have no




which really means the attainment
of a temporary frontier ; a pause merely to
enable us to organise a fresh expedition for the
exploration of what lies beyond. For frontiers
pf knowledge and capacity exist to be crossed ;
and when every child shall be permitted to
re-enter and, according to its share of the racial
powers, to dominate its lost cosmical kingdom,
we shall hear no more of barriers except the
healthy ones of sanity, there, and ours, to bar out
error alone : barriers that are themselves the
very condition of really fruitful exploitation of
reality, and so of yet further advance.
All this, then, applies to language, and to its
temporary conditions and permanent tendencies.
Once let us begin by a clear understanding of
the true gist, trend, goal, and jurisdiction of
expressive communication, and we enter a whole
new world of power to discern and appraise, and
thus to co-ordinate and act out of and upon, those
realms of experience now most tragically arresting
or misleading us.
Only, this fresh factor, this guiding concep-
tion of what Language is, and must become, will
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need first to be applied in education. When
such an appHcation really begins, much will have
been gained besides more perfect communication
in the linguistic sense. We shall hear no more,
then, of ability which might render the highest
service to the race being wasted in routine work,
or driven to suicide and even crime by sheer
desperation induced by non-recognition of gift.
Those now blind and dull to the unused human
resources will have recovered a quick and keen
sense, a racial sense, of the presence of these
resources in unlikely directions
—
will, in fact, have
been trained to look out for them—and will
with this have evolved, in regard to the genuine-
ness of claim to power of any kind, a much
more discerning judgment than is yet possible,
except in the rarest cases.
When the present state of things, as it has
been vaguely and generally indicated in the
preceding pages, is widely realised and admitted,
it will be acknowledged that a radical regenera-
tion of education, beginning in the nursery,
is urgently called for. As, however, this
regenerated education will run with, and not as
now against, a sanely broadening and deepening
stream of effectiveness and human conquest in
individuals and societies
;
as it will mean, in fact,
the application of normal powers now more or
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less in abeyance or misused, and so will make
for a true solution of the most baffling problems
of life, there need be no misgiving as to its
ultimate effect. And it will not be the least
merit of such an education, that, alone among
such ventures in the unknown, it will automatic-
ally furnish and bring to bear its own criticism,
which must needs be of the severest type we
know. For speech and writing will be con-
ducted by a quickened and clarified intelligence,
using a linguistic instrument of immensely
enhanced delicacy and power, and therefore of
faithfulness at once to the cosmic reality and the
human intention.
XXX
Meanwhile we have first to realise that to be
inexpressive is for us the deepest of disgraces,
involving the culpable neglect of our most
precious power, the shameful disregard of our
highest call. For all nature, all reality is
expressive in an inexhaustible sense : but Man
has the potency of a higher because an articulate
and interpretative expressiveness. He alone
reaches the level of the why and the because—
inaccessible until the what and the how have
been reached—and he alone can, if he will,
raise this level to undreamt-of heights which are,
even now, touched .here and there by the hand
of genius. But, except, perhaps, in the case of
mathematics—and that only as separated off from
the interests of all but specialised minds—and
of the rare poetry which in the deepest sense
should mean touch with the beauty, the honour,
the divine grace, and the infinite range of truth,
he misses as yet the noblest of all inheritances
and the crown of his powers, that of the
90
SIGNIFieS AND LANGUAGE 91
interpretative expression which is what many of
us—vaguely or ambiguously or conventionally—
call Revelation.
There is no veil over ineffable priceless Reality
to be withdrawn : only over clouded human
eyes. One sees with reverence its reflection
even now in the eyes less clouded than those of
most of us ; in the eyes of the saint, the thinker,
the worker ; above all, in the heavenly trans-
parent simplicity of the true child's eyes. All
these express in their degree and at moments,
and in so doing reveal. But we allow what we
call Expression, and especially that articulate
language which should be our truest servant and
greatest faculty, not merely to fail in revealing,
but to mask and even falsify the urgent realities
ever waiting for their appointed revealer. We
do not even yet know what Expression in its full
compass might include and deliver to us. But
already we admit from time to time that some
attitude or act, some gesture, or some change of
these—all of them acknowledged lesser varieties
of expressive resource
—
may, like some change
of condition in natural objects, be profoundly
suggestive and even explanatory.
Let us then resolve that articulate expression
shall at last become worthy of Man, of one
whose first duty and highest power is to interpret
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and thus to reveal ; whose prerogative it shall
be to lay open to the pure eye of the candid and
fearless because faithful mind, v^hat arc only
secrets and mysteries to our ignorant sophistry
and our often grotesque but enslaving belief.
For there is no ultimate difficulty. Truth is
not innately mysterious. So far from trying to
baffle us in order to enhance its command of us
and keep us humble, as creatures of the ground ;
^
so far from inducing spiritual coma or delirium
or dangerous obsession, Reality throws wide her
blessed arms, opens wide all ways and paths
which lead to her very heart, the heart of the
Real. She asks only that the word of the enigma
shall become a fitting word : that the expression
of Man who himself is to be her expression shall
be worthily
* incarnated' : that what is the very
life-blood of man's thinking shall be enriched
by purification : that in such a Word, while
wealth of connotation and association may be
boundless, a confusing or impoverishing am-
biguity shall be reckoned as intellectual disgrace,
as spiritual anathema.
And upon such a way let us bear in mind that
Reality, our true goal, never breaks us up into
rival, and thus mutually defeating and impotent,
groups ; never creates cults which exclude a
^ Latin humilis — o{ x.\\t ground, near the ground.
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hundred types of humanity in order to dominate
one. No ; Reality groups, no doubt, but groups
as our own organism groups the co-operating
functions of its unified life : a type of grouping
in which every system of parts serves every
other faithfully and gladly. The life-current,
the community of cells, the ramifying brother-
hood of fibre, muscular and nervous : each adds
to each other's power ; each is gladly servant of
all other. And all ultimately unite in serving,
and are as their great reward crowned by, a
Brain as yet in the infancy of its conquests
—a
Brain which is there to cover the whole range
of vital activities fully attained, embryonic, or
still but potential.
Is any organic aim, indeed, yet fully attained ?
Is the brain to generate its own superior ? Well,
we know not. But at least we need not inflate
Reality with our empty bladders of used-up
thought, or shrink her into the wrinkled skin of
decay. And to say
' we know not,' and for an
unnecessary moment to rest content with that,
is a crime against the Real around us and within
us which calls in the most pleading, as the
most commanding, of all voices.
Live in Me ; learn and know Me^ saith all that
is Real. For the glamour or the horror of the
Dream which haunts or fascinates, entrances or
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repels you
—the adoratiotj offalse hopes, the cult of
false despairs
—shall vanish with the
rising of my
Sun, with the bearing and the birth of my being, as
your true and waiting heritage,
I open all : I keep back nothing : see that at
least you learn to express ?ne nobly, without flaw
that need not be, orfalsity that shames you, or blank-
ness that defeats your highest powers. ...
APPENDIX
" We live in old cells, we move in old grooves, we go on using old
watchwords, apparently unconscious that these are out of date
and have lost their savour of meaning. . . . Do we not need a
leaven of independent thought to make us distinguish what is from
what has ceased to be real and essential ? . . . One is sometimes
driven to conjecture that the faculty of independent thought is for
the time weakened or distracted or numbed ; or may we hope
and believe that the thought is there, and is only deficient in
expression ?" (1)
"... language which is quite adequate in everyday life,
language in which we describe ourselves as if we were things, living
beings assigned to a particular time . . . that kind of language which
is useful and legitimate for everyday purposes, becomes altogether
misleading when we get to the problem of what is the true nature of
reality. And the great difficulty which the metaphysician . . . has
to face is just these incrustations of the everyday point of view, the
language which we get into the habit of using, and the notions which
pass current, and which give rise to what we may call superstitions
of common sense based upon them, such as that the mind may be
properly spoken of as a thing." (2)
" To what end led these ' new and fruitful physical conceptions
'
to
which I have just referred? It is often described as the discovery
of the ' laws connecting phenomena.' But this is certainly a mis-
leading, and, in my opinion, a very inadequate, account of the
subject. To begin with, it is not only inconvenient, but con-
fusing, to describe as 'phenomena' things which do not appear,
(1) Lord Rosebery, "On National Culture," October 15, 1901 [Times
report). (2) R. B. Haldane, The Path^uoay to Reality, Series I. p. 40.
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which never have appeared, and which never can appear, to beings
so poorly provided as ourselves with the apparatus of sense perception.
But apart from this, which is a linguistic error too deeply rooted to
be easily exterminated, is it not most inaccurate in substance to say
that a knowledge of Nature's laws is all we seek when investigating
Nature ? " (3)
"In the expressions we adopt to prescribe physical phenomena
we necessarily hover between two extremes. We either have to
choose a word which implies more than we can prove, or we have
to use vague and general terms which hide the essential point,
instead of bringing it out. . . , One of the principal obstacles to
the rapid diffusion of a new idea lies in the difficulty of finding
suitable expression to convey its essential point to other minds.
Words have to be strained into a new sense, and scientific con-
troversies constantly resolve themselves into differences about the
meaning of words. On the other hand, a happy nomenclature has
sometimes been more powerful than rigorous logic in allowing a new
train of thought to be quickly and generally accepted." (4)
" Tous les observateurs sont aujourd'hui convaincus qu'il faut
distinguer avec precision des reflexes cutanes ou tendineux, des
reflexes inferieurs ou superieurs, qu'il est pueril de confondre sous
le meme nom des amaigrissements et des atrophies, des tics et des
spasmes, des secousses emotives et du clonus ; il faut se decider a
comprendre qu'on ne doit pas davantage employer a tort et a travers
les mots
'demonstration, persuasion, suggestion, association, idee fixe,
etc.,' qu'il faut distinguer, dans les troubles de I'esprit, les idees fixes
de telle ou telle espece, les diverses formes de la conscience, les divers
degres de la dissociation psychologique.
" Cette precision du langage permettra seule de reconnaitre nos
erreurs inevitables, de comprendre mieux les malades, et de faire a la
psychiatric des progres analogues a ceux qu'ont accomplis les etudes
de neurologic. C'cst cette analyse psychologique qui sera le point
de depart des mcthodes de psychotherapie. . . ." (5)
(3) A. J. Balfour's Inaugural Address as President of the Brit. Assoc,
August 190+ (Nature report, August i8, 1904). (4) Professor Arthur
Schuster, Brit. Assoc. {Nature report, August 4, 1892). (5) M. Pierre
Janet,
" Qu*est-ce qu'une Nevrose ?
"




Faraday . . . was obliged to explain the phenomena to
himself by means of a symbolism which he could understand,
instead of adopting what had hitherto been the only tongue of the
learned." (6)
"
Unfortunately we go on building with names when the things
are altered or wasted away, as sometimes beavers pathetically persist
in constructing dams and canals when the water has gradually dried
up, or has changed its course. If we realise how a word may survive
to oppress and mislead us, as other ghosts do, when the underlying
thing has dissolved, we shall be more careful in setting up imposing
names as we physicians are very prone to do, until we are sure that
the thing is there ; and in no case shall we let a name give an
absolute value to temporary or developing notions." (7)
" Ainsi la science n'est pas une oeuvre de la nature, dont la con-
science ne serait que le theatre ; ce n'est pas non plus une simple
provision de recettes, dont I'utilite serait toute la raison d'etre.
C'est une activite determinee, c'est I'activite humaine elle-
meme, en tant que raisonnable et intelligente. II en est de la
science comme des langues. Ainsi que I'a finement deraontre M. Breal,
les langues ne sont pas des etres qui auraient leur principe d'existence
et d'evolution en dehors de I'esprit humain. L'esprit, I'intelligence
et la volonte humaine, voila la seule cause vraie du langage ; et le
langage ne saurait s'en detacher, parce qu'il n'y a de vie en lui que
celle qu'il tient de cet esprit meme." (8)
" C'est qu'il est impossible de donner une definition sans enoncer
une phrase, et difficile d'enoncer une phrase sans y mettre un nom
de nombre, ou au moins le mot plusieurs, ou au moins un mot au
pluriel. Et alors la pente est glissante et a chaque instant on risque
de tomber dans la petition de principe. . . . Vous donnez du
nombre une definition subtile ; puis, une fois cette definition donnee,
vous n'y pensez plus ; parce que, en realite ce n'est pas elle qui vous
a appris ce que c'etait que la nombre, vous le saviez depuis long-
temps, et quand le mot nombre se retrouve plus loin sous votre
plume, vous y attachez le meme sens que le premier venu ; pour
savoir quel est ce sens et s'il est bien le meme dans telle phrase ou
(6) Clerk-Maxwell, Scientific Papers, vol. 2, p. 318. (7) Sir T. ClifFord
Allbutt on "Words and Things
"
[The Lancet, October 27, 1 906). (8) Emile
Boutroux, Science et religion, p. 279.
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dans telle autre, il faut voir comment vous avez ete amene a parler
de nombre et a introduire ce mot dans ces deux phrases." (9)
" The indiscriminate confounding of all divergences from type
into one heterogeneous heap under the name
* Variation ' effectually
concealed those features of order which the phenomena severally
present, creating an enduring obstacle to the progress of evolutionary
science. Specific normality and distinctness being regarded as an
accidental product of exigency, it was thought safe to treat departures
from such normality as comparable differences : all were
'
variations '
alike. . . . We might as well use one term to denote the differences
between a bar of silver, a stick of lunar caustic, a shilling, or a
teaspoon. No wonder that the ignorant tell us they can find no
order in variation. This prodigious confusion, which has spread
obscurity over every part of these inquiries, is traceable to the
original misconception of the nature of specific difference, as a thing
imposed and not inherent." (10)
"Within the cell-body are many collections, often in the form
of granules, of substances which have not the protoplasmic attributes.
They constitute the 'deuteroplasm
'
of certain cytologists. But
these enclosed substances may be as far removed from protoplasm





such well-defined products of cell activity as these. The subject
is, unfortunately, obscured by conflicting terms. Nomenclatures
which were invented with the object of giving definiteness to our
ideas have served but to perplex them. The term 'protoplasm'
should be reserved as a synonym for the substance which is most
alive, the substance in which chemical change is most active, the
substance which has in the highest degree a potentiality of growth.
Anatomical distinctions are better expressed in anatomical terms.
We shall treat of such distinctions when considering the organisa-
tion of the cell." (11)
" No one can say what capacity living cells may have of taking
substances from the blood, returning some of them, and excreting
others. This unknown capacity leads to results which, when they
do not appear to be in accordance with the laws of physics, are
(9) H. Poincare, Science et mithode, pp. i66, 164-5. (10) Prof. W.
Bateson, Brit. Assoc, August 1904 [Nature report, August 25, 1904). (11)
Alex. Hill, The Body at Work, pp. 8-9.
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commonly termed 'vital.' The term is a stumbling-block which
has tripped up generations of physiologists." (12)
" Once upon a time there was a very bitter controversy as to the
respective merits of Newton and Leibniz, in the discovery and
elaboration of the infinitesimal method. Much of the dispute was
due to the use of language appropriate only to the discrete aspects
of quantity for the purpose of describing it when regarded as
continuous." (13)
"The word 'instinct' is one of those unfortunate words which
are supposed to be understood by all, words which are more fatal
impediments to the advance of science than almost anything
can be." (14)
"
Malheureusement, nous sommes si habitues a eclaircir I'un par
I'autre ces deux sens du meme mot, a les apercevoir meme I'un dans
I'autre, que nous eprouvons une incroyable difficulte a les distingucr,
ou tout au moins a exprimer cette distinction par le langage. . . .
Nous eprouverions une surprise du meme genre si, brisant les cadres
du langage, nous nous efForcions de saisir nos idees elles-m^mes a
I'etat naturel . . . nous tombons inevitablement dans les erreurs
de I'associationisme. . . . Aussi ne prennent-elles pas dans notre
esprit la forme banale qu'elles revetiront des qu'on les en fera sortir
pour les exprimer par des mots ; et bien que, chez d'autres esprits,
elles portent le meme nom, elles ne sont pas du tout la meme
chose." (15)
"Names lie nearest the surface of what we take for granted;
hence our difficulty in saying exactly what words, or ghosts of
words, we have been using, and whether any." (16)
" I infer, therefore, that the pragmatic philosophy of religion,
like most philosophies whose conclusions are interesting, turns on
an unconscious play upon words. A common word—in this case,
the word ' true '—is taken at the outset in an uncommon sense, but
as the argument proceeds, the usual sense of the word gradually
slips back, and the conclusions arrived at seem, therefore, quite
(12) Alex. Hill, The Body at Work, p. 205. (13) R. B. Haldane, The
Path^way to Reality, Series I. p. 202. (14) J. Grote, Exploratio Philoiophica,
Part II. p. 3. (15) H. Bergson, Essai sur les doyinies imme'diatei de la conscience,
pp. 91, 1 01. (16) Prof. W. Mitchell, Structure and Gron.uth oj the Mind,
PP- 372-3-
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different from what they would be seen to be if the initial definition
had been remembered." (17)
"No word has had more accusations of ambiguity, and con-
sequently of unsuitability for scientific use, alleged against it than
the word ' value.' Value in use, we are told, is one thing and
value in exchange is quite another ; and that is unquestionably the
case if we treat the phrases as museum specimens, if we put them
each in its separate case and examine them there." (18)
"




on purpose, because the endless
confused controversy about it has rendered it, like many other
words, unfit for use as a philosophical term, unless with constant
accompanying definition." (19)
" The term ' Division,' which is the established designation of
the procedure we have now to examine, is not happily chosen.
We cannot appropriately speak of dividing a word, or the meaning
of a word, for meanings are 'differentiated' rather than divided.
The very term ' Division
'
(as also such other metaphorical expres-
sions as
'parts,' 'joints,' etc.) seems almost to imply a physical
division, a division of some individual thing into its component
parts. The use of the word has the further disadvantage of pre-
judicing the interpretation to be put upon the process in its logical
aspect." (20)
"It has clearly to be said that the definition of 'precocity'
requires a little more careful consideration than it sometimes receives
at the hands of those who have inquired into it, and that when we
have carefully defined what we mean by 'precocity,' it is its absence
rather than its presence which ought to astonish us in men of
genius. ... It is no doubt true that, in a vague use of the word,
genius is very often indeed 'precocious' ; but it is evident that this
statement is almost meaningless unless we use the word 'precocity'
in a carefully defined manner." (21)
"... tout homme qui refiechit, est amene k faire en toutcs
choses, et sur laquelle repose, a vrai dire, toute vie, toute action :
(17) Bertrand Russell, Philosophical Essays, pp. 14.3-4. (18) W. W.
Carlile, Economic Method and Economic Fallacies, p. 16. (19) J. Grote,
Exploratio Fhilosofhica, Part II. p. 3. (20) W. R. Boyce Gibson, The
Problem of Logic, p. 40. (21) Havelock Ellis, A Study of British Genius
pp. 136-7.
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la distinction du principe et de I'application, de I'idee et de sa realisa-
tion. Nous voulons avec notre pensee, nous realisons avec les choses.
II s'ensuit qu'il y a, dans une action, dans une realisation quelconque,
quelque chose d'autre que la pensee, a savoir une forme materielle,
qui, si les conditions exterieures viennent a se modifier, devra neces-
sairement se modifier d'une maniere correspondante, sous peine de
changer de sens et de ne plus exprimer la meme pensee. Pourquoi
nos ecrivains du XVP siecle ont-ils aujourd'hui besoin d'explication,
sinon parce que la langue a change ? Pour dire aujourd'hui cela
meme qu'ils ont voulu dire, il faut souvent employer d'autres mots.
Toute action, toute vie implique cette distinction, car la vie consiste
a subsister au moyen du milieu dans lequel on se trouve ; et quand ce
milieu change notablement, I'etre vivant est place dans I'alternative,
ou d'evoluer, ou de disparaitre." (22)
" Before I go further, I must guard against misunderstanding by
a preliminary definition of terms. The name Monism is currently
used indifferently to describe either of two very different doctrines,
and it sometimes happens that the same person employs the word
in both senses in the course of the same argument." (23)
"The ideas of right and wrong conduct are . . . those with
which ethics is generally supposed to be most concerned. This
view, which is unduly narrow, is fostered by the use of the one
word good, both for the sort of conduct which is right, and for the
sort of things which ought to exist on account of their intrinsic
value. This double use of the word good is very confusing, and
tends greatly to obscure the distinction of ends and means. . . .
The word ' right
'
is very ambiguous, and it is by no means easy to
distinguish the various meanings which it has in common parlance.
Owing to the variety of these meanings, adherence to any one
necessarily involves us in apparent paradoxes when we use it in a
context which suggests one of the other meanings. This is the
usual result of precision of language ; but so long as the paradoxes
are merely verbal, they do not give rise to more than verbal objec-
tions." (24)
" In the exposition of mathematical thought the terms Number,
(22) Emile Boutroux, Science et religion, p. 243. (23) Prof. A. E.
Taylor's contribution to Symposium on Why Pluralism ? (Aristotelian
Proceedings). (24) Bertrand Russell, P////wo/>/'/zV«/£'««)'^, p. 16.
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Quantity, Magnitude, and Measure, meet us at every turn. But
while, in applied mathematics, writers who avoid looseness of
terminology are careful to indicate, either by definition or by clear
implication and example, the precise meaning which they attach to
these terms, in pure mathematics it is a common if not invariable
custom for writers to use these terms loosely, without any clear
intimation of the shades of meaning intended, if any are in-
tended." (25)
"What are purely descriptive principles in geometry? They
are commonly understood to refer to qualitative relations, to
exclude all reference to metrical relations. The investigation thus
appears to start from, or to be founded upon, a contradiction. To
establish the notion of distance upon principles which exclude this
notion seems at first sight to be an absurdity. But it is only the
phraseology which is absurd, because it does not express, in accord-
ance with the usual conventions of language, the actual process
of thought. The result of this violation of the conventions of
expression is ambiguity in the doctrine itself. Hence the con-
flicting opinions which have arisen as to the significance of the
theory." (26)
"
First, I would draw attention to the simple yet pregnant facts,
well established by the labours of philology, that the life of no
single word is beyond the law of development—that finality in the
significance of a word is never reached so long as that word
continues to be used. Further, that the significance of a v/ord
depends ultimately not merely on the context, not merely even
upon the whole treatise of which the context is a part, but finally
on the whole of the rest of the language—and probably, in the last
subtle analysis, it ends not even there. Now, if we remember
that, ultimately, in a rigorously formal sense, definitions depend
upon words, axioms depend upon definitions, and proof or reasoning
upon axioms and definitions, it appears to be a simple and valid
corollary that axioms, definitions, and proofs never attain finality. It
may, indeed, be replied that this very argument—and, indeed, all
arguments— assume implicitly the truth of the very axiom or
principle the argument would question. But this objection,
(25) Hastings Berkeley, Mysticistn in Modern Mathematics, pp. 60-61,
26) Il^id. p. 241.
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ultimately analysed, is irrelevant, because the argument pretends to
no higher degree of validity than the axioms upon which it ultimately
rests. Whatever limitations may be discovered to apply to the one
apply also to the other," (27)
"
Europe had tor centuries been filled with the noise of scholastic
discussion over questions incomprehensible to ordinary sense, of
which the staple was furnished by such terms &% substance, attribute,
essence, existence, eternity. And these terms were the established
stock-in-trade, as it were, not only of philosophical language but of
philosophical thought. Such as they were, these were the tools with
which Spinoza had to work. Even if he could have conceived the
notion of discarding them altogether and inventing new ones,
which, however, was in his circumstances not possible, it was only
by keeping them in use that he had any prospect of inducing
students of philosophy to listen to him. But the powerful and subtle
minds which had exercised themselves on these ideas had troubled
themselves but little as to their relation to actual things and man's
knowledge of them. It was assumed that the foundations had been
settled once for all, while the flood of new ideas, unseen and irre-
sistible, was in truth advancing to break them up. The cunningly
wrought structure of mediaeval philosophy was doomed ; and now
that it has crumbled away, philosophy goes houseless, though not
despairing ; for, after all, it is better to be a wanderer than to dwell
in castles in the air.
" But meanwhile what was a man in Spinoza's place to do ? The
terms were there to his hand, still the only currency of scholars ;
the ideas for which they had been framed were dead or dying, and
the great scientific conception of the unity and uniformity of the
world, often seen as in visions, but now unveiled in all its power
by Descartes, had already begun to spread abroad, subduing every-
thing to its dominion. A sincere and unflinching eye could already
see that in the end nothing would escape from it, not even the most
secret recesses of human thought. Only in the light of this
conquering idea could the old words live, if they were to live at all.
If any vital truth lay hidden in them from of old, it would thus be
brought out and bear its due fruit ; and what new life was wanting
must be breathed into them through the new conception of the
(27) B. Branford, A Study of Mathematical Education, p. 314-15-
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nature of things. This, I believe, was in effect the task Spinoza
took upon himself. It cannot be maintained that it was altogether
a possible one ; and it is at least doubtful whether Spinoza himself
was fully aware of its magnitude." (28)
" We find in all human sciences that those ideas which seem to be
most simple are really the most difficult to grasp with certainty and
express with accuracy. The clearest witness to this fact is borne by
the oldest of the sciences, Geometry. No difficulty whatever is
found in defining a parabola, or a circle, or a triangle. When we
come to a straight line, still more when we speak of a line in general,
we feel that it is not so easy to be satisfied. And if it occurs to us
to ask the geometer what is the relation of his
'
length without
breadth ' to the sensible phenomena of space, matter, and motion, we
shall find ourselves on the verge of problems which are still too deep
for all the resources of mathematics and metaphysics together." (29)
" No tolerably prepared candidate in an English or American law
school will hesitate to define an estate in fee simple : on the other
hand, the greater have been a lawyer's opportunities of knowledge,
and the more time he has given to the study of legal principles, the
greater will be his hesitation in facepf the apparently simple question,
What is Law ? " (30)
" The commissioners recommend that the word ' lunatic ' in the
ordinary medical certificate be deleted and replaced by the words
'
mentally defective person.' So far as comprehensiveness goes this
is admirable. Whether it is a sufficiently accurate term to merit
universal acceptance is another matter. There will, however, be
general agreement with the resolution that the word Munatic' shall




shall be called ' hospitals,' that the Board of Commissioners in Lunacy
shall be called ' The Board of Control,' and that the term ' mentally
defective' shall be defined in the proposed Act as comprising
'
persons
of unsound mind,' mentally infirm persons, idiots, imbeciles, feeble-
minded persons, moral imbeciles, epileptics, and inebriates who are
mentally affected. It is only by such a radical change in nomen-
clature that the objects of including all these classes in one legal
(28) Sir F. Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy, pp. 145-6
(29) Sir F. Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence, p. 3. (30) Ibid. p. 4.
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category could be attained, though the definite term suggested may
not, as has been hinted, be the most appropriate." (31).




to denote sentences of two years and under, and penal servitude to
denote sentences of five years and upwards, no longer has any signifi-
cance now that they are both carried out in the United Kingdom ; and
it is misleading, for both classes of prisoners are undergoing
'
imprison-
ment,' and are equally in a condition of penal servitude. The use
of the term ' hard labour ' in imposing the sentence of imprisonment,
which is not used in passing one of penal servitude, might also well
be omitted, for any prisoner sentenced to imprisonment should be
and is by law required to labour under specified conditions suitable
'to his health and his capacity ; and, in fact, except the specific kind
of labour called first-class hard labour, defined in the Prisons Act,
1865, as crank, treadwheel, and other like kind of labour, the term
' hard ' has no particular meaning, and its employment in the sentence
makes no practical difference." (32)
" Clause 6 of the Land Bill. Somehow or other this clause had
got into a terrible mess. There was a general consensus of opinion
as to what was wanted ; indeed, strange to relate, Mr. Balfour,
Colonel Waring, and Mr. Healy were for once in accord, and Mr.
Morley was not prepared to offer any substantial objection. But the
difficulty was to devise a form of words which could be inserted in
the Bill and be generally intelligible, and every member had his own
ideas on this subject." (33)
(31) Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the
Feeble-Minded {Nature, September 17, 1908). (32) Sir E. du Cane on
"Convict Prisons," quoted in Re'vie-iM of Re-vie-zvs, September 1896, p. 275.
(33) Daily Graphic, May 9, 1891.
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